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Abstract: Scientific advances across a range of disciplines hinge on our ability to make 
inferences about unobservable theoretical entities based on empirical data patterns. Accurate 
inferences rely on both a) discovering valid, replicable data patterns, and b) accurately 
interpreting those patterns in terms of their implications for theoretical constructs. The 25 
replication crisis in science has led to widespread efforts to improve the reliability of research 
findings, but comparatively little attention has been devoted to the validity of inferences based 
on those findings. Using an example from cognitive psychology, we demonstrate a blinded 
inference paradigm for assessing the quality of theoretical inferences from data. Our results 
reveal substantial variability in expert judgements on the very same data, hinting at a possible 30 
inference crisis.  
Data and materials availability: Data and analyses are available at 
https://osf.io/92ahy/?view_only=2f6d9b285c2d4e279f144b6fed363142. 
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Assessing theoretical conclusions with blinded inference to investigate a potential inference 
crisis 
At the most fundamental level, science is the process of creating, testing, and refining 
ideas that explain and predict natural phenomena. Two core components are necessary for this 
process to be effective: First, researchers must be able to produce reliable data patterns. Second, 5 
researchers must be able to reach sound theoretical conclusions based on those patterns. 
Scientists in a variety of fields have developed techniques to minimize failure in the first 
component, that is, to correct the surprisingly high rate of unreliable data patterns reported in the 
scientific literature, often referred to as the replication crisis (Open Science Collaboration, 
2015). These techniques, including pre-registration (Miguel et al., 2014), an increased emphasis 10 
on direct replication (Open Science Collaboration, 2015), and blinded analysis (MacCoun & 
Perlmutter, 2015), are crucial for promoting reliable scientific findings. However, we suggest 
that researchers looking to reform the scientific process should broaden the scope of their 
investigation to assess whether researchers can make valid theoretical conclusions by analyzing 
empirical outcomes. This broader perspective could reveal whether some fields suffer from an 15 
inference crisis; that is, a situation in which researchers have a surprisingly high likelihood of 
making incorrect theoretical conclusions even if they are working with reliable, replicable data 
patterns (Rotello, Heit, & Dubé, 2015).  
The most direct way to assess inference quality is to create data sets for which the correct 
inferences are known and to determine whether researchers can discover these correct inferences 20 
through blinded data analysis. This blinded inference procedure represents an extension of 
blinding techniques already in common practice. As outlined in 1, blinding techniques applied 
during data collection and analysis are used routinely to reduce the tendency of researchers 
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and/or participants to promote desired outcomes. Specifically, “blinded data collection” refers to 
experimental designs that blind the experimental participant, the researcher, or both to the 
assigned condition (e.g., placebo v. drug), minimizing the ability of these agents to change their 
behavior according to their beliefs about the assigned condition. “Blinded analysis” techniques, 
increasingly common in physics (MacCoun & Perlmutter, 2015), hide from the data analyst 5 
either the true experimental condition from which each observation is drawn (e.g., scrambled 
conditions) or the true value of the observation itself (e.g., addition of removable random noise), 
thereby limiting the ability of analysts to promote desired outcomes with their analysis choices, 
such as in the well-documented practice of p-hacking (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). 
These blinding procedures are valuable tools to limit the malign effects of “researcher degrees of 10 
freedom (df),” a term that describes the wide range of design and analysis choices researchers 
can use to address the same research question (Simmons et al., 2011). A recent study (Silberzahn 
et al., 2018) highlighted the influence of researcher degrees of freedom by sending the same data 
set to 29 teams of researchers and asking each team to determine whether soccer referees 
disproportionately “red-card” darker-skinner players. The results showed substantial variability 15 
in analysis techniques and conclusions across the research teams. 
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Fig. 1. Diagram of the scientific process. The top panel denotes the main stages. The middle 
panel outlines the methods used in the present paper. The bottom panel denotes common 
blinding techniques applied in each of the scientific stages, including the blinded inference 
paradigm advocated for in the present paper. 5 
These blinding methods are excellent strategies to limit the influence of researcher 
degrees of freedom and/or to assess the consistency of inferences across researchers, but they do 
not address the validity of those inferences. This extra step is crucial because researchers might 
make inference errors even if they are not promoting a desired outcome with their analysis 10 
choices, and these errors could be consistent across researchers who make similar choices (for 
examples, see Rotello et al., 2015). To assess the validity of theoretical inference, we advocate 
widespread use of a blinded inference design to supplement traditional approaches. In such a 
design, researchers who are blinded to condition assignment make inferences about the state of 
independent variables that are linked to theoretical constructs. Our characterization of the 15 
blinded inference technique is heavily influenced by a recent study by Dutilh et al. (2018) in 
which condition-blinded data sets were sent to response-time modelers who were asked to infer 
whether the conditions differed in terms of psychological constructs such as response caution 
and evidence strength. Our general charaterization of the blinded inference approach relies on 
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Dutilh et al.’s innovative design with two modifications: (1) analysts should be asked to make 
inferences about empirically manipulated factors rather than latent constructs so that the correct 
inferences can be unambiguously defined, and (2) analysts should be required to communicate 
the level of uncertainty associated with their inferences in terms of a probability distribution. 
As characterized here, blinded inference can be used in any scenario in which researchers 5 
claim that they can (a) measure a theoretical construct based on data patterns and (b) manipulate 
that theoretical construct with independent variables. If both of these claims are true, then 
researchers should be able to make accurate inferences about the state of independent variables 
specifically linked to the theoretical construct by analyzing data. If researchers fail in this task, 
then it suggests that at least one of the claims is false, i.e., researchers either lack valid 10 
techniques for measuring the theoretical construct, lack valid ways to manipulate it, or both. In 
turn, failures to validly measure theoretical constructs could arise from a variety of problems. 
One class of problems applies to the process of selecting a measurement model to map patterns 
of data to underlying processes. Different models might suggest different inferences even if they 
have a similar ability to match observed data patterns. Another class of problems applies to the 15 
process of applying the model, and includes malign factors like parameter estimation biases and 
mishandling of data. 
Concretely, consider a famous example: Mendel and his peas. Mendel recorded 
systematic patterns of variables, i.e., the relationship between the traits of parents and offspring, 
and linked them to unobservable theoretical constructs, i.e., hereditary “factors” that obeyed 20 
certain laws. His data have been described as being too clean, with too few extreme observations, 
which may be a result of “unconscious bias in classifying ambiguous phenotypes, stopping the 
counts when satisfied with the results, recounting when results seem suspicious, and repeating 
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experiments whose outcome is mistrusted” (Hartl & Fairbanks, 2007). Thus, Mendel’s 
conclusions might represent the first documented case of p(ea)-hacking. Clearly, Mendel would 
have benefitted from using blinded analyses to eliminate researcher biases, but we wish to 
demonstrate how he could have gone further.  
By applying his theory of genetics, Mendel claimed to be able to (a) measure underlying 5 
hereditable factors by evaluating the phenotype of a plant and (b) manipulate hereditable factors 
in offspring by selecting parents with certain phenotypes. These are precisely the claims related 
to the validity of theoretical inference that can be tested in a blinded inference paradigm. For 
example, someone could have given Mendel a number of plants produced by mating parents with 
certain traits (unknown to Mendel) and asked him to use his laws of hereditability to predict the 10 
likely traits of the parent plants by interpreting the traits of the offspring. Mendel would not have 
been able to make perfect inferences, of course, given that some phenotypes can be produced by 
multiple genotypes, but he should have been able to make substantially more accurate inferences 
than someone without a valid theory linking the phenotypes of parents and offspring. We claim 
that a procedure like this one would have provided a more compelling demonstration of the 15 
predictive value of Mendel's laws than unblinded data that could be "massaged." Moreover, by 
revealing specific offspring phenotypes for which the parents’ phenotypes were particularly 
difficult to predict accurately, it might have allowed the limitations in Mendel’s basic theory to 
be identified more quickly.   
 Many modern scientists share with Mendel the challenge of making inferences about 20 
theoretical constructs on the basis of indirect evidence. For example, modern geoscientists infer 
the composition and dynamics of Earth’s interior from a variety of indirect methods, including 
radar and magnetic fields. Likewise, cosmologists have inferred that dark matter exists in the 
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absence of direct observation. In the authors’ discipline, cognitive processes are inferred from 
observable behaviors such as decision accuracy or response times. Thus, a critical step in 
establishing the validity of many scientific claims is to test the inferential power of the data, and 
this is precisely what the blinded inference procedure achieves: If the researcher is blind to the 
nature of the manipulation(s), conclusions about what experimental factor was manipulated 5 
depend entirely on the data and not on the expectations or unconscious biases of the researcher. 
In what follows, we demonstrate the blinded inference paradigm using an example study 
from recognition memory research. The scheme in the middle of 1 summarizes the design. We 
conducted a study in which we sent recognition memory researchers (“contributors”) seven data 
sets generated with common experimental manipulations and asked them to make inferences 10 
about memory performance. In a recognition memory task, participants are asked to indicate 
whether they previously encountered a stimulus (often a word) in a certain context (typically a 
study list). A common question is whether, and to what extent, an independent variable produces 
changes in discriminability (the ability to distinguish stimuli that were and were not seen in the 
target context), and in many cases this determination is obscured by differences in response bias 15 
(the overall predilection for saying “studied”). Signal detection theory (SDT; Macmillan & 
Creelman, 2005) was developed in the 1950s with the goal of separating discriminability and 
bias, and SDT-based measures have been in common use throughout psychology and other 
disciplines ever since. Several other models or measurement techniques have been developed as 
alternatives to SDT (Ratcliff, 1978; Riefer & Batchelder, 1988), and some of these also achieved 20 
wide popularity throughout psychology (e.g., Erdfelder et al., 2009). Thus, researchers have had 
nearly seven decades to hone their ability to distinguish discriminability and bias as theoretical 
constructs, and thousands of papers have been published using models and measures that claim 
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to be able to do so. We tested published memory researchers on their ability to detect whether 
memory discriminability varied between experimental conditions that might have also varied in 
terms of response biases. 
We have two primary research questions: First, how variable are inferences across 
researchers? Finding high variability across researchers would be unsettling, given that they all 5 
analyzed the same data. Second, and more importantly, how accurate are researcher inferences? 
If recognition memory researchers have effective methods for manipulating and measuring 
discriminability and bias based on seven decades of investigating these constructs, then they 
should be able to make accurate inferences about whether conditions come from the same level 
or from different levels of a discriminability manipulation. 10 
To preview, we found surprisingly high variability in the inferences of memory 
researchers asked to interpret the same data, and we also found that many researchers made more 
inferential errors than would be expected from sampling variability in the data. Given that our 
task required a relatively simple inference, we suspect that this pattern of surprisingly low 
inferential accuracy is likely to be found in other research areas. Broadly, however, we 15 
emphasize key positive outcomes of this study. Our study exemplifies scientists' commitment to 
improving the research process, in that many respected memory researchers had the courage to 
put their conclusions to a public test. Moreover, despite the troubling error rate of the group, our 
framework identified multiple researchers as having made highly accurate inferences. We 
therefore believe that our study demonstrates a promising methodology for the future goal of 20 
improving inference quality by identifying best practices. 
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Methods 
Experimental Design 
There were two main phases of data collection. In Phase 1, we collected experimental 
data in a large-scale recognition memory experiment that used standard study materials and 5 
included orthogonally-varied factors known to influence memory discriminability and response 
bias.1 The between-subjects design of Phase 1 is analogous to any comparison of memory 
performance between a special population (e.g., Alzheimer’s patients) and a control group, 
except that our participants were randomly assigned to conditions.  In Phase 2, subsets of the full 
data set were selected to generate seven two-condition experiments in which only the factor 10 
affecting discriminability varied (2 experiments), only the factor affecting response bias varied 
(2 experiments), both factors varied (2 experiments), or neither varied (1 experiment).  The 
conditions in these seven experiments were masked and the data were shared with researchers 
who had published papers investigating recognition memory, and these experts (or 
“contributors”) were asked to rate the probability that each experiment had only a memory 15 
discriminability manipulation, only a response bias manipulation, both, or neither. Contributors 
were not told how many experiments of each type were included in the data sets, and they were 
free to select their preferred strategy for distinguishing memory discriminability and response 
bias. 
20 
Phase 1 
1 All study procedures were approved by the Institutional Review Board at the University of Massachusetts 
Amherst. 
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Participants. A total of 459 participants were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011) using psiTurk (Gureckis et al., 2016). Participants 
earned $1.00 for completing the experiment. 
Materials. The experiment utilized 104 high-frequency (at least 100 occurrences/million 
in Kučera & Francis, 1967) English nouns that were 3-7 letters long. Four words were used in 5 
the practice block, and the remaining 100 were equally divided into two study lists, A and B. 
Participants were randomly assigned to study either list A or list B. All participants were tested 
on the combined list of all 100 words, resulting in complete counterbalancing of stimulus status 
(studied or unstudied) across participants.  
Procedure. The experiment was coded in javascript using the jsPsych library (de Leeuw, 10 
2015). Participants were given detailed instructions that included comprehension checks for key 
components, and they completed a brief practice block before beginning the main task. Word 
order in the study and test phases was independently randomized for each participant. On each 
trial of the study phase, participants were asked to report whether the presented word represented 
an animate object. All of the stimulus words represented clearly animate or inanimate objects, as 15 
judged by four independent raters. Each word remained on the screen until the participant 
entered a response for the animacy question. On each trial of the test phase, participants were 
first asked to report whether or not they had seen the presented word in the study phase. 
Participants were then asked to report how confident they were in their response on a 1-3 scale, 
in which a “1” meant “Not Sure” and a “3” meant “Very Sure”. All responses were made via key 20 
press, and participants were asked to balance speed and accuracy throughout the experiment. 
Memory discriminability and bias were manipulated between participants. 
Discriminability was manipulated by varying the number of times each word was presented in 
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the study phase (1, 2, or 3). Bias was manipulated by instructing participants to avoid making 
particular kinds of errors in the test phase. Specifically, conservative participants were told to 
particularly avoid false alarms (“old” responses to unstudied items), liberal participants were told 
to particularly avoid misses (“new” responses to studied items), and neutral participants were 
told to avoid both errors equally. This manipulation was reinforced by varying the quality of the 5 
error feedback in the test phase, such that conservative participants saw a “BAD ERROR!” 
message after false alarms and standard “ERROR” message after misses, liberal participants saw 
a standard “ERROR” message after false alarms and a “BAD ERROR!” message after misses, 
and neutral participants saw a standard “ERROR” message in both cases. The “BAD ERROR!” 
message was accompanied by a reminder of the type of error to particularly avoid and was 10 
presented longer than the standard message (2500ms vs. 500ms).  
Phase 1 results. Complete data are available at the OSF site. A summary of the data 
analyzed in each of the seven experiments appears in Table 1. We offer no statistical 
interpretation of these data, given our goal of crowd-sourcing that interpretation in Phase 2 
(described next).  However, we note that the outcome of this experiment is very consistent with 15 
decades of recognition memory literature. For example, hit rates increased and false alarm rates 
decreased with repeated learning opportunities (as in, e.g., Lachman & Field, 1965; Ratcliff, 
Clark, & Shiffrin, 1990; Stretch & Wixted, 1998; Verde & Rotello, 2007). We also observed 
typical effects of response bias manipulations: both hit and false alarm rates tended to increase as 
increasingly liberal responding was encouraged (e.g., Dube, Starns, Rotello, & Ratcliff, 2012; 20 
Han & Dobbins, 2009; Starns, Hicks, Brown, & Martin, 2008; Swets, Tanner, & Birdsall, 1961) 
and the effects of bias appeared weaker when encoding strength was greater (e.g., Ratcliff, Sheu, 
& Gronlund, 1992). 
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Experiment Condition Discriminability Bias N Hit Rate False Alarm Rate 
A 1 3 Liberal 24 .873 .239 
2 3 Conservative 24 .875 .126 
B 1 1 Liberal 27 .865 .266 
2 2 Conservative 25 .840 .191 
C 1 2 Neutral 27 .861 .205 
2 3 Neutral 24 .911 .174 
D 1 1 Neutral 27 .781 .256 
2 1 Conservative 26 .739 .195 
E 1 1 Conservative 26 .742 .192 
2 3 Neutral 24 .815 .190 
F 1 1 Liberal 26 .812 .287 
2 3 Liberal 26 .935 .164 
G 1 2 Liberal 26 .847 .208 
2 2 Liberal 26 .913 .208 
Notes: Discriminability represents the number of times each target word was presented in the 
study phase (1, 2, or 3). Liberal and conservative biases refer to instructions to particularly avoid 
missing studied items and false alarms to unstudied memory probes, respectively, in the test 
phase; neutral bias emphasized both errors equally. N indicates sample size, and hit and false 5 
alarm rates indicate the proportion of correct and erroneous “old” judgments. 
Table 1. Definition and summary statistics of the seven experiments sent to contestants. 
Phase 2 10 
Participants. Contributors were recruited through targeted e-mails to researchers with a 
background in recognition memory and/or models of memory and decision making. These 
individuals were encouraged to forward our invitation to other experts. Out of the 121 
researchers who were initially contacted, a total of 46 contributors (comprising 27 PIs and 19 
members of their labs) submitted analyses. The data were available in two phases, one for which 15 
the confidence-rating data were withheld and another that included the confidence ratings. The 
purpose of the phases was to investigate whether or not confidence ratings improved inference 
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quality. Of the 27 groups of contributors, 14 also submitted new analyses when the confidence 
rating data were released. Two contributors declined authorship, and their inferences are de-
identified. Of the 44 contributors who accepted authorship, 33 (representing 19 labs) opted to 
have their inferences associated with their identities; the others chose to remain anonymous. The 
27 PIs had an average of 14.7 years of post-Ph.D. experience. 5 
Materials. Subsets of data collected in Phase 1 were sampled to form seven 
“experiments” for the contributors to analyze, summarized in Table 1. Each experiment was 
designed to have two between-participant conditions that differed in terms of either a memory 
discriminability manipulation, a response bias manipulation, both, or neither. The data for each 
condition were created by taking separate random samples of participants who studied list A and 10 
participants who studied list B and combining them. Each condition had either an equal number 
of participants from the two lists or very close to equal (off by one). The data sets that 
contributors received for the binary analyses included data from the test phase with variables for 
participant ID, condition (1 or 2), study list (A or B), trial (1-100), test word, whether or not the 
tested word had been studied (target or lure), the participant’s binary response (“old” or “new”), 15 
and response time for the binary response. The data sets that contributors received for the 
confidence rating analyses additionally included the participant’s confidence rating, both on the 
original 1-3 scale and on a recoded 1-6 scale that ranged from “Very Sure New” to “Very Sure 
Old”, and response time for the confidence rating response. 
Each contributor completed a submission template summarizing their analyses (see OSF 20 
site for an example). The template asked contributors to report the authors collaborating on the 
submission, accept or decline authorship, and indicate whether they would prefer their 
conclusions be de-identified. Contributors were then asked to provide a description of their 
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process for analyzing the data in sufficient detail for external replication, a description of any 
exclusion criteria that were applied, and any code that they were comfortable sharing. All shared 
code is available at the OSF site. Contributors were lastly asked to report four probabilities for 
the four possible types of experiment; namely, experiments for which the two conditions were 
from (1) different levels of a memory strength (discriminability) manipulation but not different 5 
levels of a bias manipulation, (2) different levels of a bias manipulation but not different levels 
of a memory strength manipulation, (3) different levels of both a memory strength and a bias 
manipulation, or (4) the same levels of memory strength and bias (i.e., null data sets). 
Procedure. Materials for the binary and confidence rating data analyses were posted to 
separate private OSF pages. The materials for the binary data analyses were made accessible to 10 
contributors on July 7, 2017 and analyses were due August 31, 2017. The materials for the 
confidence rating data analyses were made accessible on September 9, 2017 and analyses were 
due on November 1, 2017. No changes to the binary data contributions were allowed after the 
confidence rating data were released. To support the independence of contributors’ inferences, 
all communication of the coordinating team with contributors was conducted via individually-15 
generated emails, contributors’ identities were not shared until mid-November of 2017, and 
contributors were strongly discouraged from discussing their interpretations of the data with one 
another in case they accidentally discovered their common participation.  
Results 20 
Our response format was designed to highlight the fact that contributors needed to 
distinguish the effects of discriminability and bias, but we are primarily interested in conclusions 
about whether there was a discriminability manipulation. A wide range of research questions in 
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the recognition memory literature require conclusions about discriminability, whereas bias is 
more often considered a “nuisance” process. Moreover, focusing on discriminability gives our 
contributors the best chance to succeed because discriminability is better understood and less 
theoretically contentious than bias (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). To isolate discriminability 
inferences, we collapsed the “memory alone” and “both” categories to represent the reported 5 
probability of a discriminability manipulation and the “bias alone” and “neither” categories to 
represent the reported probability of no discriminability manipulation (see OSF for bias results, 
which unsurprisingly showed poorer inference performance than the discriminability results).  
Fig. 2A shows histograms of the reported probability of a discriminability manipulation 
across contributors for each of the seven experiments, with regions reflecting correct and 10 
incorrect inferences marked in green and red, respectively. The most striking finding shown in 
Fig. 2A is the extremely high variability across contributors, with responses spanning a wide 
range of probabilities for all experiments. For example, some contributors reported a 0% chance 
that the conditions in Experiment A came from different levels of a memory discriminability 
manipulation, some reported a 100% chance, and the rest follow an essentially uniform 15 
distribution of probability estimates between these two extremes. Responses were concentrated 
on the correct side for some experiments (e.g., D, F), but not for others (A, B). The high level of 
variability is surprising given that all researchers received the same data sets. Note that Fig. 2B, 
addressed in greater detail below, shows the data that informed the researchers’ inferences, 
namely the proportion of studied and non-studied items called “studied” (or the “hit rate” and 20 
“false alarm rate” in signal detection terms). The dark symbols show results with no participants 
or trials excluded and grey symbols show results of applying the exclusion criteria used by each 
contributor. A priori, some experiments seemed likely to be easier to interpret, for example, 
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when both the hit and false alarm rate effects were large and consistent with the same theoretical 
inference (e.g., in Exp. F, the higher hit rate and lower false alarm rate for Cond. 2 both indicate 
higher memory discriminability in this condition).  
The variability in inferences was matched by high variability in the analysis methods 
selected by our contributors. These methods, identified on the y-axis of Fig. 2D and described in 5 
the Supplemental Materials, are purportedly capable of distinguishing memory discriminability 
and response bias. Within most of these techniques, some contributors used traditional 
frequentist statistical methods (e.g., maximum likelihood estimation, significance tests) and 
others used Bayesian methods (e.g., posterior distributions of parameters or model selection via 
Bayes Factors). When all analysis choices were considered, no two contributors used exactly the 10 
same analysis approach (e.g., same exclusion criteria, measurement technique, and statistical 
approach). 
To summarize inferential accuracy, we counted the number of times across experiments 
that each contributor reported the true discriminability effect status as the most likely outcome, 
that is, reported a greater than 50% chance of a discriminability manipulation when 15 
discriminability was in fact manipulated or reported a less than 50% chance of a discriminability 
manipulation when it was not. A histogram of these results appears in Fig. 2C. Slightly over half 
of the contributors performed well by this measure, correctly describing five or six of the seven 
data sets, but the other contributors performed more poorly. We note that the contributor with 
zero correct inferences estimated a 50% chance of a discriminability manipulation for every 20 
experiment, so in fairness, this contributor did not make any incorrect inferences either.  
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Fig. 2. Discriminability inference performance. Panel A: Histograms of contributors’ estimated 
probabilities of an effect in each of the seven experiments. Red denotes incorrect estimates 
whereas green denotes correct estimates. Panel B: Hit and false alarm rates for each of the seven 
experiments. Black points represent original values. Grey points represent values after applying 5 
each contributor’s specified exclusion criteria. Panel C: Histogram of the number of correct 
inferences out of the seven experiments analyzed for each contributor. The blue dashed line 
denotes simulation-based benchmark for reasonable performance. Panel D: The adjusted Brier 
score for each contributor, labelled by their chosen method of analysis. (Note that 19 contributor 
groups, highlighted in bold, were willing to have their names associated with their responses. 10 
The OSF page includes a figure that identifies these contributors.) Black points represent scores 
for the binary data analysis. Red and green points represent scores for the data analysis with 
confidence ratings where performance decreased or increased, respectively. The black vertical 
line denotes chance performance; The blue dashed line denotes simulation-based benchmark for 
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reasonable performance. Labels on the y-axis denote analysis strategies (defined in the 
Supplemental Materials) and statistical choices (B = Bayesian; F = frequentist). 
Even a valid inference procedure will sometimes reach inaccurate conclusions due to 
sampling variability, so we needed to identify a benchmark accuracy level below which it would 5 
be reasonable to conclude that an invalid inference technique had been applied. We performed 
model simulations to identify this benchmark. In the simulations, we generated data sets by 
randomly sampling data from a signal detection model and analyzing those data sets with 
measures derived from the same model (see the Supplementary Materials for details). Each 
simulated data set contained the same type of information as the data sets sent to contributors 10 
with no labeling to identify the experimental manipulation. Thus, the simulation code performed 
blinded inference just like our contributors. The key difference between the simulation code and 
the contributors’ analyses is that the former uses an inference procedure that is known to be valid 
(i.e., consistent with the process that generated the data), so the results represent expected 
performance levels when sampling variability is the only source of inaccuracy. We set 15 
performance benchmarks such that only 10% of the simulated studies fell below the value, 
meaning that performance is rarely that bad when a valid inference method is applied.  
The benchmark for number correct is indicated with a dashed line in Fig. 2C. Nearly half 
of the contributors fell below this benchmark, suggesting that some aspect of their inference 
method was ineffective. To assess whether our empirical data sets were a particularly misleading 20 
sample (like the 10% of simulated data sets that produced accuracy below our benchmark even 
when a valid inference technique was applied), we used the analysis technique from the 
simulation on the actual data sets sent to contributors and obtained correct inferences for 6 of the 
7 data sets. Thus, the empirical data sets do not seem to be a “bad” or misleading sample.  
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Scientists should be able to express appropriate degrees of certainty in their conclusions, 
so we also assessed accuracy with a measure that is sensitive to the contributors' probability 
estimates: the Brier score (Brier, 1950). Brier scores compute the variance between the predicted 
probability that an outcome will occur and the actual outcome (coded as a 0 or 1). In our case, 
the outcome is whether or not the two conditions in an experiment come from different levels of 5 
a discriminability manipulation. Therefore, the best possible performance is produced by 
reporting a 0% predicted chance of a discriminability manipulation for all data sets without a 
discriminability manipulation and a 100% predicted chance for all data sets with a 
discriminability manipulation, the worst possible performance is the converse, and "chance" 
performance means reporting a 50% chance for all data sets (meaning that estimates provide no 10 
information about which data sets have discriminability manipulations). We adjusted our Brier 
scores such that 0 represents chance performance, 1 represents the best possible performance, 
and –1 represents the worst possible performance (see the Supplementary Materials for details). 
In our simulations to explore performance levels for a valid inference technique, the median 
adjusted Brier score was .44 and 10% of scores fell below .13, which will thus serve as our 15 
benchmark for problematic inferences. Applying the analysis technique from the simulations to 
the empirical data sets sent to contributors produced a Brier score of .38, which is well above our 
benchmark.  
Fig. 2D shows ranked Brier scores for our contributors (contributions are labeled by their 
inference technique). The contributor who reported 50% for every data set is on the chance line. 20 
Although this contributor returned no correct inferences, their probability estimates 
outperformed about one-third of contributors in terms of Brier scores. The contributors who are 
below chance made multiple incorrect inferences with high confidence levels; in other words, 
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their reported probabilities provided misinformation as to which data sets were likely to have a 
discriminability manipulation. Roughly half of contributors were below the benchmark for 
problematic inferences, shown by the dashed vertical line, demonstrating that researchers fairly 
commonly made the mistake of being inappropriately confident in their incorrect inferences. 
Reassuringly, some contributors achieved Brier scores that are basically as high as can be 5 
expected given sampling variability in the data, suggesting that they applied appropriate 
inference methods. Given the poor overall performance, one might wonder whether these high-
performing contributors were simply lucky, indicating that none of our contributors truly 
succeeded in the inference task. The Supplementary material includes analyses that strongly 
support the conclusion that at least some of our contributors applied valid inference procedures.  10 
Inference errors were not associated with the choice of any particular analysis technique. 
The y-axis of Fig. 2D reveals no clear pattern. Methods used by multiple contributors tend to be 
distributed among the top, middle, and bottom rankings, as are techniques relying on frequentist 
and Bayesian approaches. Our simulation results also showed that inferences about 
discriminability are generally robust to different measurement methods, at least for data patterns 15 
similar to those in our experiments. Specifically, we reanalyzed all of the simulated data sets 
using a different measure of discriminability (Pr = hit rate – false alarm rate) that is consistent 
with a different class of models (Pazzaglia, Dube, & Rotello, 2013; Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988) 
than the data-generating signal detection model. The Pr analyses achieved accuracy levels that 
were well above our benchmarks for problematic inferences in terms of number correct and Brier 20 
scores (see the Supplementary materials for details). Pr depends on different processing 
assumptions than the signal-detection model used to sample the simulated data sets, but the two 
models often make similar discriminability inferences for data set like the ones we sent to 
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contributors (inferences start to diverge for data sets that have large bias effects, but our bias 
effects were moderate). Thus, it is possible to make appropriate conclusions about 
discriminability when using a measurement model that does not exactly match the processes 
generating the data, and selecting an incorrect measurement model cannot entirely explain the 
poor inference performance revealed in Figure 2. 5 
Variability in inferences was not predictable from contributors’ rules for censoring data. 
Recall that the grey symbols in Fig. 2B show the mean hit and false alarm rates for each 
condition with the exclusion criteria used by each contributor. Although these censoring rules 
clearly resulted in different hit and false alarm rates, we were unable to identify any systematic 
relationship between these rules and inference accuracy. Moreover, seven contributors did not 10 
exclude any data, yet they used different analytic tools and reached different conclusions about 
the probability of a discriminability effect. 
Theoretically, discriminability and bias effects are more easily distinguished with 
receiver operating characteristics (ROCs) formed from confidence-rating data than with binary 
old/new response data (Rotello et al., 2015).  In a second round of blinded inference, we re-sent 15 
the data sets with an addition column for the reported confidence level on each trial, and 14 
contributors offered new probability ratings based on the ROCs in each experiment.  The 
resulting Brier scores appear in Fig. 2D with lines to mark the difference from the corresponding 
Brier scores based on the binary-response data. The largest changes were actually negative, 
reflecting reduced inferential accuracy with ROC data. 20 
Discussion 
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Distinguishing memory discriminability effects from bias effects is a common empirical 
issue for recognition memory researchers that has important theoretical and practical 
implications; for example, understanding memory processes in a special population (e.g., older 
adults) hinges on the ability to determine if differences from a control group reflect a memory 
discriminability effect. The available tools to interpret discriminability are well-established, and 5 
some have been in use for nearly 70 years (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). Despite these truths, 
our expert contributors had mixed success when faced with the task of inferring whether 
discriminability had been manipulated across conditions that might have also had different levels 
of response bias. Strikingly, the reported probability of a discriminability effect was highly 
variable across contributors even though they all received the same data sets. One natural 10 
interpretation of these results is that the data themselves were too noisy to allow clear inference. 
Our simulations are inconsistent with that conclusion: 90% of simulated sets of experiments 
yielded five or more (of seven possible) correct inferences about discriminability. Thus, we view 
the outcome of this blinded inference study as a challenge to recognition memory researchers; 
one which should result in a re-evaluation of our methods, and in humbler presentation of future 15 
conclusions that rely on the ability to distinguish discriminability and bias effects. The fact that 
we found generally low inference quality when researchers used decades-old analysis tools 
shows that the normal practice of science is not sufficient to ensure effective analysis techniques. 
Indeed, some examples of systematically problematic inferences have survived decades of 
scientific review, to the detriment of theoretical progress in those domains (see, e.g., Dube, 20 
Rotello, & Heit, 2010, for a specific example and Rotello et al., 2015, for a more general 
treatment). Widespread use of the blinded inference procedure will help to quickly identify these 
inference problems and refine analysis methods to optimize inference quality.   
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Constraints on generality. Our study only provides information about a single research 
scenario – assessing discriminability changes based on recognition memory data – but the fact 
that we found surprisingly low accuracy for this relatively simple inferential task suggests that 
problematic inference procedures may plague a broad range of research domains. However, these 
different domains must be assessed individually in future work, and our results should not be 5 
used to make general conclusions about general validity of scientific research. Even within the 
field of recognition memory, our results are only directly troubling for studies that attempt to 
make conclusions about discriminability and bias when both processes can potentially vary. 
Although this is an unavoidable situation for some research questions (e.g., comparing memory 
across different populations), for other questions memory researchers can substantially simplify 10 
the inferential process by experimentally controlling bias when evaluating discriminability, or 
vice versa. Moreover, memory researchers use a wide range of different types of paradigms and 
data beyond the recognition tasks that we investigated.   
The blinded inference paradigm demonstrated here is also not a substitute for good theory 
testing and development. A theory that makes correct assumptions could perform poorly in 15 
blinded inference based on limitations in the analysis tools available to implement the 
measurement properties of the theory, and a theory that makes incorrect assumptions might 
nevertheless serve as a useful tool in some situations (e.g., Newton’s Laws are sufficient for 
many applications despite being incomplete). Our results show that inference problems are not 
limited to particular theoretical approaches in recognition memory: even researchers who relied 20 
on the same measurement model were highly variable in their inferences. Good theory 
development should run on several parallel tracks simultaneously – empirical assessment, 
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quantitative modeling or analysis, and, we argue, blinded inference studies – to establish that 
applications of the theory can truly measure what they are intended to measure.  
Another potential limitation of our results is that contributors might have applied 
different analysis standards for our project than they would in a “real” study conducted in their 
labs. We cannot rule out the possibility that our contributors might have made better inferences if 5 
they were analyzing their own data for their own purposes, but there are many good reasons to 
consider this unlikely. The vast majority of our contributors elected to be co-authors on this 
manuscript, and a majority (19/27) agreed to have their name directly linked to their performance 
level in presentations and publications (note that while inference methods were used as labels in 
Figure 2, results identified by contributor are available on OSF). Thus, one could argue that our 10 
contributors had a stronger incentive for rigor compared to typical studies in which no one is 
likely to re-run the analyses and conclusions are never compared to an “answer key.” Indeed, our 
contributors generally displayed a remarkable level of motivation and dedication to the project, 
with some applying state-of-the-art techniques like hierarchical Bayesian modeling and/or 
analyzing the data with multiple measurement models to inform their conclusions. Moreover, the 15 
majority of contributors (14/27) agreed to make their analysis code publicly available (see OSF). 
Thus, we are confident that the inference problems that we observed are not based on a simple 
lack of effort, and although we cannot rule out the possibility that some contributors made 
careless, easily correctable mistakes, we seriously doubt that these mistakes can fully explain the 
inference problems that we observed. 20 
Comparison to similar studies. Our results are similar to those of Silberzahn et al. 
(2018) in that both reveal high variability in inferences across contributors who all received the 
same data. In many ways, though, the high variability in our contributors’ inferences is even 
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more surprising – and troubling – given that our inference task represented a fairly common 
research scenario. Whereas Silberzahn et al. (2018) asked contributors to address the novel 
research question of whether referees are biased against darker-skinned players by analyzing 
real-world data that lacked an experimental control, we asked our contributors to address a 
research question that has been a focus of recognition memory research for decades and to do so 5 
with data from controlled experiments. 
Our results are also similar in some respects to the previous blinded inference study 
reported by Dutilh et al. (2018), but direct comparisons are difficult based on procedural 
differences between the two studies. In that study, response-time (RT) modelers analyzed 
unlabeled data sets with the goal of inferring whether the conditions differed in psychological 10 
constructs represented in RT models. Unfortunately, contributors disagreed about which 
cognitive processes should theoretically vary as a function of certain experimental 
manipulations; in other words, they had different views about what the “answer key” should be. 
Different scoring rules were developed in light of this disagreement, making it difficult to 
characterize overall performance. Using the originally planned scoring, at least, the proportion of 15 
correct inferences (71%) was similar to our overall accuracy rate (68%). We recommend that 
future blinded inference studies adopt our strategy of asking contributors to make inferences 
about experimental manipulations as opposed to underlying theoretical processes to avoid 
scoring ambiguities. A second difference between our study and Dutilh et al. (2018) also limits 
our ability to compare the results: Their contributors were not required to express their 20 
uncertainty with probability distributions. As a result, we do not know if their contributors’ 
inferences varied as dramatically as ours, with contributors reporting effect probabilities ranging 
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from 0% to 100% for some data sets, and we cannot compare Brier score results between the two 
studies.  
Refining analysis quality. Blinded inference can be a method to not only assess 
inference quality, but also to improve it. Many of our contributors expressed surprise when they 
learned of their performance level and conveyed that they would carefully re-evaluate their 5 
chosen analysis techniques. Our results show that inference problems in recognition memory are 
not a simple matter of choosing poor measurement techniques, as there are many instances of the 
same technique being used by both high- and low-performing contributors. Defining the 
characteristics of effective inference will require additional research, but for now we recommend 
that analysts try a variety of analysis techniques and, ideally, have multiple researchers 10 
independently analyze the data, reserving high confidence for consistent inferences.  
Conclusion. We will end by again emphasizing that all of our contributors drew 
inferences about the same data. Thus, the disparate conclusions reached by our contributors are 
not another example of the replication crisis. Contributors were allowed to use any analysis and 
any data censoring criteria they preferred, but those researcher degrees of freedom could not 15 
systematically influence their conclusions because contributors were blind to the nature of the 
experimental manipulation. Thus, our findings suggest that current efforts to improve research 
quality are incomplete, in that they largely focus on limiting researchers’ ability to bias results by 
promoting desired outcomes (whether implicitly or explicitly). Even unbiased analysis 
techniques can be ineffective, so it is critical for scientists to put their skills as analysts to direct 20 
(and public) tests. The blinded inference paradigm is a promising method of assessing inference 
quality and improving analysis procedures, so any field that uses analysis techniques to link data 
patterns to unobserved theoretical constructs will benefit from applying this method. Our results 
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suggest that even well-established areas of research may be facing an inference crisis that 
warrants equal consideration with the replication crisis.  
5 
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